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A NOTE OF EXPLANATION 
 
In 1987, a group of former students of Robert Tucker held a confer-
ence in Princeton, New Jersey, devoted to various aspects of the pere-
stroika reforms. This conference, organized by Stephen Cohen and Mi-
chael Kraus, seemed an appropriate way to honor one of the few scholars 
in the Soviet field who, far from being flummoxed by perestroika, had 
long brought to our attention both the need and potential for reform in the 
Soviet Union. 
 My report at this conference was on the topic of the reformers’ use of 
NEP as a legitimating symbol. The NEP theme proved to be an extremely 
rich guide to the debates swirling in the Soviet media that were such a 
hallmark of the Gorbachev years. Public opinion mutated at high speed 
during perestroika, and so, with a view to publication, my report was sub-
stantially updated at least twice (whence the use of “chronicle” in the ti-
tle). The final revision was made in the summer of 1990. At that point, 
events overtook us. As the Soviet Union crumbled and fell, the publica-
tion of a volume devoted to the problems of perestroika was no longer vi-
able. 
Enough time has now passed, however, to allow an out-of-date study 
of current events to turn into a useful study of a fascinating historical epi-
sode. Part of the historical value of my essay comes precisely from its 
time-bound perspective, so I have left it substantially unchanged from its 
1990 rewrite. At that time, I added a final section entitled “The Waning of 
NEP.” By tracking the use of NEP as a rhetorical theme, I was able to 
sense what, in hindsight, was the waning of perestroika itself. 
I am happy to publish this article in The NEP Era, since perestroika’s 
revival was undoubtedly the most important episode in the afterlife of 
NEP. I also hope my article evokes the atmosphere of the Gorbachev 
years, a transitory, swift-changing and passionate period in Soviet history 
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that is too easily overlooked today.
1
 As before, “Perestroika’s Revival of 
NEP” is dedicated to my teacher and friend, Robert C. Tucker. 
  
 
“Lenin said NEP was meant seriously and for a long time, but he 
never said it would last forever.” 
                                                          Joseph Stalin, December 1929 
  
“We must build and renovate socialism. We must advance our so-
ciety by relying on and using all the sap that comes to us from roots 
that go deep into our history, especially into socialist history, and by 
chopping off everything negative that comes from the 1930s and 
1940s and from the recent stagnant period.”   
                                                  Mikhail Gorbachev, February 1988  
 
As the year 1920 came to a close, Soviet Russia was near the end of a 
long slide into economic and social disaster. Since Russia’s entry into the 
world war in 1914, the country had known invasion and intervention, bit-
ter class and national conflict, desperate improvisation by political lead-
ers, and rapidly accelerating economic disintegration. The end of the civil 
war had not brought the relief everyone had hoped for. With no food for 
the workers or fuel for the machines, urban life almost ground to a halt. 
The cities felt compelled to take what they needed from the peasants by 
force; the peasants responded with a wave of revolts that threatened the 
existence of the new Bolshevik state authority.   
At the last moment the Bolsheviks found a way out of this deadlocked 
situation by rethinking a basic policy toward the peasants. The party had 
previously assumed that if free trade in grain were allowed, state grain 
collection would be impossible and the urban workers would starve. The 
peasants were therefore told to deliver to the state all the grain they nor-
mally would have marketed; the state promised goods in return but could 
not keep this promise. In one of his last great acts of leadership, Lenin 
convinced the Bolsheviks to allow the peasants to freely sell their grain 
after they had fulfilled the demands of the state grain collection. This pol-
icy was called “the food-supply tax” and it enabled the Bolsheviks and 
                                                          
1. See the recent discussion of the “historical amnesia” about perestroika in Stephen 
Cohen, Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War
 
(New 
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2009). 
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the cities to get sufficient grain without driving the peasants to despera-
tion.
2
  
The food-supply tax was the most dramatic of many new economic 
policies that became widespread in 1921 and the years that followed. The 
policies were rapidly seen as a unity-the New Economic Policy (NEP) – 
that promised to provide not only a response to the crisis of 1920 but also 
a long-term strategy for constructing socialism. The essence of this strat-
egy was to involve the peasants in their own transformation through ap-
peals to material interest and through direct demonstration of the practical 
advantages of socialism. But today’s Soviet Union was not destined to be 
built by the logic of NEP. 1929 became what Stalin called the year of the 
great breakthrough – a breakthrough to forced-pace industrialization in 
the cities and coercive collectivization in the countryside. Stalin’s Soviet 
Union went on to its own disasters and triumphs, and the era of NEP 
seemed to recede into historical irrelevance.   
In 1985 the society built during the Stalin era began to face up to the 
dimensions of the impasse to which it had been led by Stalin’s methods. 
For those searching for a path out of the crisis, NEP suddenly seemed ir-
relevant no longer. At the 27
th
 Party Congress in February 1986, Mikhail 
Gorbachev went back to the origins of NEP and called for a creative use 
of the food-supply tax as a guiding principle of reform. Later that year the 
official journal Kommunist called for renewed attention to Lenin’s writ-
ings of the NEP period. The prominent reform journalist Fedor Burlatsky 
wrote a series of long articles in Literaturnaia gazeta that provided a de-
tailed, point-by-point comparison between NEP as conceived by Lenin 
and the aims of the new reform movement.
3
  
This is not the first time the meaning of NEP has been at the center of 
political debate. Lenin’s own approach to NEP evolved considerably; his 
last word on the subject-five articles published in early 1923 and de-
scribed by Gorbachev as “a revolution within the revolution, no less pro-
found, perhaps, than October,” is regarded today as almost a charter for 
                                                          
2. “Food-supply tax” is a more accurate translation of prodnalog than the usual “tax-in-
kind.” For full discussion, see Lih, “Bolshevik Razverstka and War Communism,” Slavic 
Review 45 (1986): 673-88, and Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914-1921 (Berkeley: Univ. 
of California Press, 1990).   
3. Kommunist, no. 12 (1986), pp. 9-10; see also ibid., no. 7 (1987), p.  63); Fedor 
Burlatsky, articles in Literaturnaia gazeta, April 16, 1986; Oct. 1, 1986; July 22, 1987. 
Burlatsky had already made comparisons to NEP in an article in Voprosy filosofii, no. 6 
(1984), pp. 23-39. For other early articles, see Evgeny Ambartsumov, “Analiz V. I. 
Leninym prichin krizisa 1921 g. i putei vykhoda iz nego,” Voprosy istorii, no. 4 (1984), 
and the reply by E. Bugaev, “Strannaia pozitsiia,” Kommunist, no. 14 (1984), pp. 119-26; 
see also “Iskusstvo tochnogo rascheta,” A.  Kolesnichenko, Pravda, Oct. 28, 1986.   
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perestroika. After Lenin’s death in 1924, the struggle within Bolshevism 
was in many ways a struggle over the meaning of NEP. Was NEP a re-
treat, a necessary compromise with the “petty-bourgeois” peasantry, a 
“path to socialism,” or some combination of all three? According to Sta-
lin, the retreat involved in the introduction of NEP had been made for the 
sake of a new offensive. He therefore claimed that his “offensive along 
the whole front” in 1929 – which resulted in collectivization in the coun-
tryside and elimination of the private and cooperative sector in the towns 
– was thoroughly consistent with NEP.
4
 Stalin’s famous Short Course of 
party history published in the late 1930s dismissed his opponents with 
these words: “Since the oppositionists were poor Marxists and complete 
ignoramuses in questions of Bolshevik policy, they understood neither the 
essence of NEP nor the character of the retreat undertaken at the begin-
ning of NEP.”  
In actuality, Stalin’s opponents – especially Nikolai Bukharin and 
Alexei Rykov – had never denied the necessity of an economic offensive, 
in other words, an accelerating socialist transformation of the economy 
and especially of the countryside. The dispute was over methods: when 
Stalin switched from the gradualist use of material incentives to a coer-
cive “revolution from above,” he had in effect repudiated NEP. While 
Stalin claimed he had brought NEP to a triumphal conclusion with the 
construction of a socialist economy in the 1930s, his opponents argued 
that he had deliberately killed it in the late twenties.
5
  
Stalin’s version was orthodoxy until very recently, and within its 
framework NEP was treated with great respect: “Only a few examples 
can be found in history of any important political undertaking that justi-
fied itself so completely and thoroughly, had such an immediate effect 
                                                          
4. Istoriia VKP(b) (kratkii kurs) (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1938), p. 245.  For Gorbachev on 
Lenin’s last articles, see Pravda, April 21, 1990, “Oktiabr i perestroika: revoliutsiia 
prodolzhaetsia,” Kommunist, no. 17 (1987), p. 9, and Perestroika: New Thinking for Our 
Country and the World (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), pp.  25-26. 
5. A party resolution from 1925 called for “an economic offensive of the proletariat on 
the basis of NEP.” Cited in Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 12 (1968), p. 85. On the political 
struggles of the 1920s, see Robert C. Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary: A Study in History 
and Personality (New York: Norton, 1973), and Stephen F.  Cohen, Bukharin and the Bol-
shevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938 (New York: Norton, 1971. The ques-
tion of dating the end of NEP is one part of an extensive discussion of historical periodiza-
tion in preparation for a new textbook of party history. Contributions to this debate can be 
found in Kommunist, no. 12 (1987), pp. 66-79, and Maksim Kim, Voprosy istorii, no. 6 
(1988), pp. 115-30, as well as issues of Voprosy istorii KPSS starting with no. 6 (1987).   
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and such a long- term historical role as the transition to NEP.”
6
 According 
to Soviet scholars, NEP was a necessary phase in the development of any 
and all socialist revolutions. After the Second World War, a NEP phase 
became mandatory for the popular democracies in Eastern Europe, and 
Soviet specialists often advised third world countries to use NEP meth-
ods. But one reason for all these compliments was to neutralize NEP as a 
critical alternative to the Stalin model. NEP was a pre-socialist phase that 
the Soviet Union had passed long ago; any of its valuable features had al-
ready been incorporated into Soviet institutions.
7
 
Occasionally slogans from NEP found their way into official rhetoric. 
During the most ambitious attempt before perestroika to deal with Sta-
lin’s economic heritage – the reform measures of the 1960s – the NEP 
experience was used to strengthen the call for expanded market relations. 
Beyond official rhetoric, one scholar’s careful reading of Soviet econom-
ic literature revealed “undercurrents’ that harked back to Nikolai Bukha-
rin and his defense of NEP against Stalin.
8
 Most of the themes of today’s 
reform thinking were present during the post-Stalin period; the major dif-
ference is that today the anti-Stalinist implications of NEP are no longer 
an undercurrent – they have come forcefully to the surface.   
The most striking manifestation of this change is the rehabilitation of 
Bukharin, not just as an innocent man unjustly accused by Stalin, but as 
the principal spokesman for the NEP alternative. In 1982, a popular book 
could be written on NEP that did not so much as mention him.
9
 He was 
still, if not a criminal spy, then a “right deviationist”; now he is a martyr 
for the ideals of the revolution. By 1988, one Soviet writer described the 
conflict between him and Stalin as the conflict between good and evil, be-
tween life and death, between Christ and Satan.
10
 The widespread interest 
                                                          
6. Iu. A. Poliakov, V. P. Dmitrenko, N. V. Shcherban’, Novaia ekonomicheskaia politi-
ka: razrabotka i osushchestvlenie (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1982), p. 236. 
7. Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1st ed. (1939) and 2nd ed. (1954), entries on 
New Economic Policy; I. V. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (Peking: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1972), pp.  12-13. For a statement by Imre Nagy on NEP as ap-
plied to Hungary, see Nicolas Spulber, Organizational Alternatives in Soviet-type Econo-
mies (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 130-35, and for an application to 
Nicaragua, see Sergei Mikoian, Latinskaia Amerika, no. 3 (1980), pp. 34-44. See also Ze-
novia A. Sochor, “NEP Rediscovered: Current Soviet Interest in Alternative Strategies of 
Development,” Soviet Union, 9, part 2 (1982): 189-211.  
8. Moshe Lewin, Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates: From Bukharin 
to the Modern Reformers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979), especially chapter 
12.  Lewin’s book is essential background for understanding today’s debates. 
9. Poliakov et al., Novaia ekonomicheskaia politika.   
10. As cited by Mikhail Antonov, Nash sovremennik, no. 2 (1989), pp. 125-50.   
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in Bukharin has led to a Soviet edition of the biography written by Ste-
phen Cohen. While almost all of the defendants of the show trials of the 
1930s have been legally rehabilitated, only Bukharin and other prominent 
defenders of NEP such as Rykov have received extensive and sympathet-
ic coverage in articles, documentaries, and even exhibitions. In the 1930s, 
Stalin was called “Lenin today’ – the reformers wanted to make Bukharin 
“Lenin today.”
11
  
Today’s revival of the 1920s has many aspects; the period has been 
praised for its art and literature, its legal institutions, and even its statis-
tics.”
12
 In many ways, the return to NEP is a recovery of a rich but forgot-
ten cultural heritage. For Gorbachev and the reformers, it shows that there 
are alternatives to Stalin’s socialism that are rooted in Soviet history; 
Gorbachev can therefore claim that he is no revolutionary trying to tear 
down the fundamental structure of the system, but a reformer calling on 
Soviet society’s own unrealized ideals.”
13
  
 
“Socialist Property Needs Its Owner”: NEP and the Meaning of So-
cialism  
NEP can be used an alternative model to Stalinism only insofar as it 
had Lenin’s blessing. Gorbachev and the reformers have concentrated on 
two symbols of Lenin’s association with NEP the new food-supply sys-
tem that inaugurated NEP in 1921, and the short article “On Cooperation” 
that he wrote in 1923 on the eve of his final debilitating stroke.   
At first glance, the food-supply tax seems an inappropriate symbol for 
perestroika, since it was an extremely heavy burden imposed on the peas-
antry in a time of famine and economic disorganization. Lenin himself 
said in 1921 that the tax was the aspect of the new policy that represented 
the crushing heritage of the past. A tax paid in kind rather than in money 
                                                          
11. Two indications of the Bukharin revival: a Komsomol political club named after 
him, and Evgeny Evtushenko’s poem dedicated to Bukharin’s widow (Izvestiia, March 26, 
1988). For background, see Stephen F.  Cohen, “Bukharin, NEP, and the Idea of an Alter-
native to Stalinism,” in Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917 
(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 71-92. On manifestations of the current revival, 
see Julia Wishnevsky, “Bukharin’s Legacy in the USSR Today,” Radio Liberty Research 
Bulletin, 3 16 (1988).   
12. Many major literary works (for example, Evgeny Zamiatin’s We) and artists (for 
example, Pavel Filionov) of the 1920s are being rediscovered. On legality, see Iurii 
Feofanov’s somewhat unconvincing tribute to N. V. Krylenko in Pravda, Aug. 11, 1987; 
on statistics, see Vasily Seliunin and Grigorii Khanin, “Lukavaia tsifra,” Novyi mir, no. 2 
(1987), pp. 181-201. 
13. On the distinction between revolutionary leadership and reform leadership, see 
Robert C.  Tucker, Politics as Leadership (Columbia, MO: Univ. of Missouri Press, 1981).   
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also seems a strange rallying cry for economic reforms that reject the 
command economy in favor of a money-based market system.   
Why, then, was the food-supply tax adopted as a symbol of the liberat-
ing heritage of NEP? The answer lies in the other half of the new policy, 
namely, the legalization of the free market in grain. The Bolsheviks were 
understandably reluctant to make the market a prime symbol of their poli-
cy, and so the tax itself came to be used as the label of the new hands-off 
policy of the state. Under the system symbolized by the food-supply tax, 
the state said to economic producers: do what you want in whatever way 
you want to do it-as long as the state gets what it needs, it will let you 
alone. In 1921, this message was given to pre-socialist peasant producers. 
Today Gorbachev wants to send the same message – in his words, “the 
possibility of ending the enserfment of constructive energy” – to collec-
tive fans and state industrial enterprises.”
14
  
Gorbachev also uses the introduction of the food-supply tax to show 
that he is not the only Soviet leader who proclaimed a drastic change of 
orientation and then had to convince many skeptics within the party about 
the socialist credentials of the new course. A centerpiece of Lenin’s de-
fense of his new course is the article “On Cooperation,” viewed by to-
day’s reformers as the key Lenin text, far outstripping What Is To Be 
Done?, State and Revolution, and other works more familiar in the West. 
The article was written by a sick man who had evident difficulty express-
ing his thoughts, but the basic message is clear: the peasants must be led 
to socialism by appealing to their material interest, and cooperatives are 
an adequate means of bridging the gap between the interests of the peas-
ant and the interest of society as a whole. In his oft-cited words: “Given 
social ownership of the means of production, given the class victory of 
the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, the system of civilized cooperators is 
the system of socialism.
15
  
The food-supply tax and “On Cooperation” are complementary sym-
bols of NEP today. The food-supply tax symbolizes the hopes that the 
liberated energy of material self-interest will revitalize the Soviet econo-
my. “On Cooperation” is interpreted today as a call for a diversity of eco-
                                                          
14. “Oktiabr i perestroika: revoliutsiia prodolzhaetsia,” Kommunist, no. 17 (1987), p. 8.  
Gorbachev’s term raskreposhchenie was used in 1921 as well.   
15. “On Cooperatives” and Lenin’s other final articles can be found in Robert C. Tuck-
er, ed., The Lenin Anthology (New York: Norton, 1975), pp. 701-48. The scholarly consen-
sus is that the last articles represent a break with Lenin’s past thought; for a different read-
ing, see Lars T.  Lih, “Political Testament: Lenin, Bukharin and the Meaning of NEP,” pa-
per presented to the conference on NEP, Moscow, October 1989 [published in Slavic Re-
view, 50, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 241-52]. 
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nomic forms based on initiative from below. This is in contrast to the 
past, when NEP was praised as a way of overcoming the heterogeneity of 
economic forms in pre- socialist Russia by creating a completely socialist 
society. This diversity of economic forms – in Gorbachev’s words, “a 
mechanism for the realization of the whole spectrum of the interests of 
working people” – is not meant to weaken the state but to strengthen it by 
restricting it to its essential tasks and giving it useful partners in the form 
of independent social organizations.   
In trying to give this vision concrete substance in terms of today’s 
challenges, the reformers have come right up against the problem of so-
cialist ownership – or more precisely, the problem of the socialist owner. 
A Russian word that is central to this problem is khoziain. Although it can 
be translated as “owner, it has richer connotations than the English term. 
It is etymologically related to words meaning peasant farm (khoziaistvo), 
the economy as a whole (narodnoe khoziaistvo, or people’s enterprise), 
and mistress of the house (khoziaika). The word conjures up images of a 
hardy, canny, industrious and self-reliant peasant owner who manages his 
property in worthy fashion. Under the centralized Stalinist system, the ul-
timate khoziain was Stalin himself, and in fact this was his nickname 
(usually translated as “the Boss”) among those who worked directly un-
der him. 
The reformers’ remedy for the cynical apathy inherited from the 
Brezhnev era is to create in each producer a feeling of being a genuine 
khoziain. As the reformist economist Gavriil Popov (later mayor of Mos-
cow) put it in his campaign platform when running for the congress of 
People’s Deputies: “Socialist property needs its owner [khoziain].”
16
 The 
ideology of the khoziain is a socialist version of the image of the citizen 
who knows how to protect himself and contributes to society from a posi-
tion of independence.   
In the state sector of the economy, this ideology has given rise to the 
reform slogan “full khozraschet.” This term is short for khoziaistvennyi 
raschet the usual translations – “economic accountability,” “financial in-
dependence” – give only the palest reflection of what is meant by it. The 
technical meaning of khozraschet is indeed the budgetary independence 
of a state enterprise: it receives no subsidies and in turn has control over 
what it earns. But the depth of the hopes placed on khozraschet is better 
conveyed by a translation such as “owner’s calculation.” Under khoz-
raschet, socialist producers will make economic decisions based on the 
calculations of a real owner who suffers from bad decisions and gains 
                                                          
16. Moscow News, no. 4 (1989). 
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from good ones. This will not only lead to better decisions but will give 
producers the feeling that they have a stake in the economy as a whole.   
To understand the implications of khozraschet, we must grasp the dou-
ble nature of the centralized economic system inherited from the Stalin 
era. On the one hand, basic economic decisions are made at the top and 
imposed on producers. This is the message of the label made popular by 
Gavriil Popov: “the Administrative System.”
17
 (In Russian, administriro-
vanie has connotations of ordering people around without regard for their 
interests.) But this familiar aspect of the system should not obscure the 
other side of the coin- the enormous pressure from below that results 
when all resources come from the center. The center is surrounded by a 
thousand outstretched hands: if over-centralized decision-making is a 
curse on the system, so is izhdivenchestvo, which can be translated as 
“dependence bordering on parasitism.”   
The task of khozraschet is to lift both these curses: the managers of lo-
cal state enterprises are not subjected to direct orders and physical alloca-
tion of products, but they also cannot expect the central authorities to bail 
them out with subsidies. Their decisions will have to be based on market 
indicators such as prices and profits, and so khozraschet implies the ex-
panded use of “money-commodity relations,” a Marxist term for an inde-
pendent market.”
18
 Gorbachev’s wager on democracy within the factory 
also requires khozraschet. Without genuine enterprise independence, elec-
tions of managers will have a closer resemblance to an American high 
school choosing a powerless class president than a board of directors 
choosing a chief executive. 
 Advocates of full khozraschet and the expanded use of money-
commodity relations look back to NEP as the golden age of “khozraschet 
socialism.” The inventor of this term, Nikolai Shmelev, wrote in a famous 
article in the journal Novy mir: “The directive instead of the ruble has 
reigned too long in our economy. So long that we seem to have forgotten 
that there was a time, there really was a time, when the ruble reigned in 
our economy and not the directive – that is, common sense and not arbi-
                                                          
17. Gavriil Popov, “S tochki zreniia ekonomista (o romane Aleksandra Beka ‘Novoe 
naznachenie’),” Nauka i zhizn’, no. 4 (1987), pp. 54 ff. 
18. A. Malafeev, “Tovarno-denezhnye otnosheniia i perestroika khoziaistvennogo me-
khanizma, Komnunist, no. 18 (1986), pp. 78-88; P. Belousov, “K istorii tovarno-denezh-
nykh otnoshenii v SSSR,” Voprosy ekonomiki, no. 1 (1987), pp. 95-104; V. I. Manuilov, 
“Metodologiia leninskogo issledovaniia tovarno-denezhnykh otnoshenii v period 
stroitelstva sotsializma i sovremennost,” Voprosy filosofii, no. 10 (1987), pp. 39-48. 
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trary schemes thought up in offices.”
19
 As Shmelev’s words indicate, 
much of reform thinking can be described as a revolt of economics 
against politics. Shmelev has gone so far as to argue that “all that is eco-
nomically ineffective is immoral, and all that is effective is moral.”
20
  
This statement goes too far for many Soviet citizens (and no doubt for 
many in the West): Shmelev has been attacked as a “proponent of nou-
veau-richeism who is unconcerned about the growing economic inequali-
ty in the country.
21
 The economist Mikhail Antonov has made himself the 
spokesman of those who feel that to let the ruble reign is to dethrone mo-
rality. According to Antonov, Lenin did not intend NEP to be “an idyllic 
development of ‘khozraschet socialism’.” Antonov strongly opposes the 
program of the present-day “heirs of Bukharin,” which he fairly accurate-
ly identifies as the unhindered operation of money-commodity relations, 
the replacement of the collective farms by capitalist-style farmers, a sub-
stantial weakening of the foreign trade monopoly, and full freedom of ac-
tion for foreign entrepreneurs.
22
  
Khozraschet is far from being a new slogan; it is easy enough, for ex-
ample, to find endorsements of it by Stalin himself.
23
 The question today 
is rather whether khozraschet will be used as just another method of en-
forcing “plan discipline,” or whether it will be used as a gateway to genu-
ine independence of state enterprises. Outside the state sector, the reform-
ers also want to see the emergence of a genuine khoziain, but in this case 
their hopes are placed on a revival of the cooperatives.   
During the civil war, most Bolsheviks were hostile to the cooperative 
movement, primarily because cooperative activists were politically on the 
                                                          
19. Nikolai Shmelev, “Avansy i dolgi,” Novyi mlr, no. 6 (1987), pp. 142-58. An ex-
tended discussion of the NEP economic model can be found in Shmelev and Vladimir Po-
pov, Na perelome: ekonomicheskaia perestroika v SSSR (Moscow: Novosti, 1989); an 
English translation is available as The Turning Point: Revitalizing the Soviet Economy 
(London: Tauris: 1989). For a discussion of the economic thought of the 1920s, see the de-
bate over the report by V. Manevich, Voprosy istorii, no. 10 (1989), pp. 46-75.   
20. Moscow News, no. 6 (1988), p. 10; see also Shmelev, ibid., no. 47 (1988): “It’s a 
kind of insanity! We haven’t yet realized the simple truth that the market is always right.” 
For Shmelev’s defense of his position, see Stephen Cohen and Katrina Vanden Heuvel, 
Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev’s Reformers (New York: Norton, 1989), 
pp. 151-56. 
21. Anatoly Saliutskii, Literaturnaia Rossiia, Dec. 23, 1989; English translation in Cur-
rent Digest of the Soviet Press (hereafter CDSP), 41, no. 8 (1989). 
22. Mikhail Antonov, “Na perelome: razmyshleniia o nravstvennom smysle razvitiia 
ekonomiki i ekonomicheskoi nauki,” Moskva, no. 3 (1988), pp. 3-26; Nash sovremennik, 
no. 2 (1989); CDSP, 41, no. 8 (1989). 
23. For example, Stalin, Economic Problems, p. 19. See the discussion by M. I. Pis-
kotin, Sotsializm i gosudarstvennoe upravienie (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1984), ch. 2.   
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extreme right wing of the socialist camp. Lenin tried to combat this prej-
udice because of the practical usefulness of the cooperative  
organizations. In “On Cooperation,” Lenin argued further that they could 
be used as a bridge from single-owner peasant forms to more advanced 
socialist forms.   
During the 1920s, although the cooperatives had lost all political inde-
pendence, they expanded their operations into many different fields. But 
mass collectivization in the early 1930s put a halt to this activity, even 
though Stalin claimed to be fulfilling “Lenin’s cooperative plan. The col-
lective farms (kolkhozes) were indeed billed as agricultural production 
cooperatives, but all other forms of cooperatives – credit, marketing, con-
sumer, craft – were eliminated or reduced to insignificance. The collec-
tive farms themselves quickly lost the distinguishing feature of a coopera-
tive, namely, independent economic activity based on democratic self-
government. Economic pressure from state demands and internal interfer-
ence by the party reduced the kolkhoz’s freedom of activity to a mini-
mum.   
The essence of today’s agricultural reforms is not only to restore this 
freedom of action to the collective farm but to turn it into a “cooperative 
of cooperatives” – in other words, put effective decision-making as close 
as possible to the peasant household. Through long-term leases of land to 
peasant families, the reformers are aiming at no less than “to revive the  
peasantry” and to change the peasant’s status from a hired hand of a state-
controlled enterprise to a genuine khoziain.
24
  
The reformers claim that during NEP the Bolsheviks fully sympathized 
with the peasants’ desire to become masters of their own land; only dur-
ing the Stalin era were such aspirations rejected as petty-bourgeois indi-
vidualism.
25
 In reality, today’s view of the peasant is a fundamental break 
with the Bolshevik heritage. No Bolshevik, no matter how sympathetic to 
the peasants’ interests, doubted that the peasants had to be “remade” in 
the image of the urban proletariat, and to lose their petty-bourgeois prop-
erty instincts. Much closer to today’s outlook are the views of Petr Stoly-
pin, the tsarist statesman who tried to break up the peasant commune in 
the years after the 1905 revolution on the assumption that a secure feeling 
of individual ownership was a necessary precondition of agricultural pro-
gress. Stolypin has always been anathema to the Russian revolutionary 
                                                          
24. Gelii Shmelev, Moscow News, no. 43 (1988).   
25. Mikhail Gorbachev, Pravda, March 16, 1989; Gennadii Lisichkin, Moscow News, 
no. 45 (1988).   
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tradition; the Bolsheviks would have been shocked to discover that his 
views carry more weight today than their own.
26
  
The image of the peasantry as a national resource rather than an em-
blem of backwardness is the main reason for the new-found prominence 
of Aleksandr Chayanov, the most important agrarian economist of the 
1920s. Chayanov was one of the founders of a school of economists that 
looked on the peasant family farm as a unique and viable economic form, 
one that defied the framework of both “bourgeois” and Marxist econo-
mists. Although he was not a Bolshevik or even a Marxist, he played an 
important role in public discussion of the cooperative movement and 
agrarian policy throughout the 1920s. He was arrested in 1930 on 
trumped-up charges of counterrevolutionary activity. His further fate was 
unknown until recently; we now know that after working in internal exile 
as an agricultural official in Central Asia, he was re-arrested in 1937 and 
shot in 1939.
27
  
Although Chayanov and his theories were quickly forgotten in the So-
viet Union, his work became extremely influential in the West and in the 
developing countries. Soviet society had thus been denied a legitimate 
source of national pride. Like much of the reformist outlook, the Cha-
yanov revival has its roots in the Brezhnev era; for almost two decades, 
we are told, a group of scholars has “collected and studied Chayanov’s 
heritage.”
28
 When Chayanov and other non-party scholars such as Nikolai 
Kondratiev were posthumously cleared of all legal charges in the summer 
of 1987, agricultural economists were ready to present detailed exposi-
tions of Chayanov’s views.   
It is not Chayanov’s examination of technical questions about the op-
timal size of cooperatives that accounts for his widespread popularity to-
day, but the celebration of the peasant’s double role as “owner-worker” 
[khoziain-rabotnik]. As the chairman of a collective farm who called for 
                                                          
26. See the comparison between Stolypin and Bukharin in a debate between the liberal 
critic Benedikt Sarnov and the conservative critic Vadim Kozhinov in Literaturnaia 
gazeta, no. 13 (1989).   
27. Vladimir Kabanov, “Aleksandr Vasilevich Chaianov,” Voprosy istorii, no. 6 (1988), 
pp. 146-67; Nadezhda Figurovskaia, “K stoletiiu so dnia rozhdeniia A. V. Chaianova,” Vo-
prosy ekonomiki, no. 1 (1988), pp.52-62; V. Gavrichkin, “Aleksandr Chaianov – grazhda-
nin i uchenyi,” Izvestiia, Jan. 19, 1988. See also the comment by Viktor Danilov in Vo-
prosy istorii, no. 3 (1988), pp. 21-24.   
28. “Posthumous Justice,” Moscow News, no. 33 (1987), p. 12; B. Surganov in Moscow 
News, no. 7 (1988), p. 4. The major works in English are A.  V.  Chayanov, The Theory of 
Peasant Economy, eds.  Daniel Thorner, Basile Kerblay and R. E. F. Smith (Homewood, 
IL: R. D. Irwin, 1966), and “Journey of my brother Alexei to the land of peasant utopia,” in 
The Russian Peasant, 1920 and 1984, ed.  R. E. F. Smith (London: Cass, 1977). 
Perestroika’s Revival of NEP: A Contemporary Chronicle, 1985-1990                                       13 
the exoneration of the kulaks put it: “We are just beginning to realize, as 
it was proved by our outstanding economist Chayanov, that independent 
farmers fully correspond to the development of socialism.”
29
 It has even 
been asserted that Lenin’s article “On Cooperation” was inspired by Cha-
yanov’s writing.
30
 In the 1920s, writers like Chayanov who wanted to 
combine the virtues of the peasant way of life with modern technology 
were scorned as “neo-populists.” But today Gorbachev argues that “the 
objective is to revive and encourage the best features of the traditional 
peasant character.”
31
 
Perestroika’s agricultural reforms enjoy wide support, but the same 
cannot be said about the cooperatives in the cities. The urban coopera-
tives are both perestroika’s greatest success and its greatest failure. They 
are a success because the cooperatives called into life by the reform legis-
lation have genuinely changed the economic landscape in the Soviet Un-
ion and made a visible impact on the daily life of its citizens; they are a 
failure because the hostility they have engendered has weakened support 
for perestroika and given the old guard its most persuasive talking 
point.
32
  
The cooperatives will determine which image of NEP will be upper-
most in popular consciousness: the NEP where the liberated energy of 
economic independence leads to personal and social prosperity, or the one 
where disreputable “nepmen” (barely tolerated private entrepreneurs of 
the 1920s) flaunt their wealth while honest workers barely eke out a liv-
ing. Cooperatives began playing a role in reform rhetoric in 1986, and in 
the fall of that year, “individual labor activity” – or more briefly, moon-
lighting – was given legislative protection.
33
 In the spring of 1988, when 
a fully-worked out Law on Cooperatives was passed, Gorbachev claimed 
that the application of the ideas of the new law “will signify a new quali-
tative stage in the development not only of the cooperative movement, 
                                                          
29. Moscow News, no. 10 (1989).   
30. Vladimir Bashmachnikov, Literaturnaia gazeta, no. 7 (1989), p. 11.   
31. Gorbachev, “Potentsial kooperatsii – delu perestroiki,” Pravda, March 24, 1988; 
English translation in Moscow News, no. 14 (1988), supplement. 
32. The number of people working in cooperatives grew from 156 thousand to 1.4 mil-
lion in the space of a year (Izvestiia, March 10, 1989). For a description of the impact of 
the cooperatives, see Robert Cullen, “Letter from Rostov-on-Don,” The New Yorker, June 
12, 1989, pp. 107 ff.   
33. The text of the law can be found in CDSP, 38, no. 46 (1986): 6-8; see A. Iu. Kabal-
kin, “Zakon ob individualnoi trudovoi deiatelnost – vazhhnyi rychag osushchestvleniia sot-
sialno-ekonomicheskoi politiki,” Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, no. 3 (1987), pp. 12-21; 
Libor Roucek, “Private Enterprise in Soviet Political Debates,” Soviet Studies, 40 (1988): 
46-63.   
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but also of the whole of Soviet society.”
34
 The Law on the Cooperatives 
is one of the legislative milestones of perestroika; some have called it the 
best enactment of the reform period and others have called it a bad mis-
take.
35
  
Later legislation regulating the cooperatives reflected the difficulties of 
assimilating independent economic enterprise into the command econo-
my.  In the summer of 1988, legislation proposing high taxation rates for 
cooperatives was announced, but – a sign of the times – it was withdrawn 
after a heated discussion in the Council of Ministers. Legislation on taxes 
only appeared the following year and even then the central government 
avoided difficult decisions by handing over the job of setting tax rates to 
local authorities. In 1989, the cooperatives ran into trouble with another 
child of perestroika, the new popularly elected legislature. The legislature 
provided a forum for the deep hostility to cooperatives, especially those 
involved in middleman activities. The government responded to this hos-
tility by introducing restrictive legislation.
36
  
Despite the legislative stops and starts, the cooperatives had been 
launched with a broad ideological justification based on NEP. In Gorba-
chev’s 1988 speech introducing the Law on the Cooperatives, the cooper-
atives were used as a symbol of how much Soviet society lost by the ter-
mination of NEP: “As non-equivalent exchange began developing be-
tween the state sector and the cooperatives, as command-style methods of 
management came to be used more and more, as the democratic princi-
ples of society started losing ground, the very idea of cooperation began 
to be frowned upon. . . . The cooperatives could not exist without khoz-
raschet and broad democracy.”  
Gorbachev belligerently refuted those who claimed that “cooperation 
is not a socialist form of management but a return to private enterprise.” 
On the contrary, “cooperatives – a mass social movement of the working 
people in a society freed from exploitation and class antagonism – are by 
their nature fully in line with the goals of socialism.” The cooperative 
movement is also “one of the more important levers for broadening the 
                                                          
34. Gorbachev, “Potentsial kooperatsii – delu perestroiki,” Pravda, March 24, 1988.   
35. The best: Boris Kurashvili, Moscow News, no. 12 (1989), p. 13. A mistake: Iurii 
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36. For material on earlier legislation about the cooperatives, see Moscow News, no. 3 
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democratic process as a whole” – a model for state enterprises on their 
way to khozraschet and democratic self-management.
37
   
The reformers’ main hope is that the liberated activity of the new 
khoziain would infuse new energy into the economy and help the popula-
tion shake off its passivity and its “leveling” instincts. Sometimes the re-
formers sound as if they have been briefed by the Small Business Admin-
istration:   
It turns out that it is not only the [high prices] that are unacceptable, 
but the independence of the cooperator. In contrast to all others he is the 
master [khoziain] of his own affairs and to that extent free. By his very 
existence he presents a challenge to people’s barracks psychology, their 
subordination and dependence. In other words, he “thrusts himself for-
ward,” he “must have more than the rest,” and it is this frank, legalized 
nonconformity that is intolerable to the philistine.
38
  
The cooperatives were also assigned an important role in the over-all 
strategy of reform. In the short run, the cooperatives were supposed to 
find hidden reserves and to provide the population with immediate im-
provements in the provisions of goods and services. In the long run, the 
small-scale services provided by the cooperatives will create an environ-
ment in which large-scale state enterprise can function properly. Soviet 
specialists have calculated that thirty-five to forty billion man-hours are 
wasted each year in lines for food, so that in effect “every seventh able-
bodied person does not work, but is occupied in searching and acquiring 
                                                          
37. Gorbachev, “Potentsial kooperatsii”; see also Perestroika, pp. 95-96. For a full-
scale presentation of this outlook, see the article by the noted agricultural expert G. I. 
Shmelev, “‘Ne smet’ komandovat,’,” Oktiabr, no. 2 (1988), pp. 3-26; L. E. Fain, “Razvitie 
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no. 3 (1988), pp. 22-34), G. Gorlanov, no. 3 (1988), pp. 43-41, and V. Marianovskii, no. 5 
(1988), pp. 92-101. See also the exchange of letters between Kosolapov and Anatoly Bu-
tenko in Voprosy filosof ii, no. 12 (1987), pp. 142-50.    
38. Gennadii Batygin, “Vse, chto ne zapreshcheno. . . ,” Krokodil, no. 17 (1988). 
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food products.”
39
 This stunning social inefficiency not only demoralizes 
the consumer but also undercuts the possibility of technically advanced 
production. In the words of Gavriil Popov:  
 
The future . . . will not be determined in private cafes or individual 
workshops. This future is tied to success in information science, 
computers, robotic technology, in the opening up of Siberia and the 
oceans. But in order for our worker or technician, engineer or manag-
er, scientist or student to be able to eat a hot roll in the morning with-
out trouble and to avoid running around the stores for hours in search 
of available goods or standing in lines at a repair shop – [in order 
that] hundreds of thousands of heads and hands be freed from imagi-
nary work in countless offices and administrations – in order to strike 
a powerful blow at the underground economy that is corrupting our 
society – we need a flourishing individual sector.
40
 
  
If a high-minded image of NEP inspired the reformers who summoned 
forth the new enterprises, the reality of the cooperatives helped reinforce 
another image. In popular literature and movies, NEP has long been por-
trayed as a sort of Roaring Twenties in which nepmen and other shady 
underworld figures loom large. According to rumor, a young man ap-
palled by high prices at a new cooperative cafe picketed the cafe with a 
sign that said “Down with NEP!”
41
 
 The large income of many of the new cooperative members offends 
against several deep-seated Soviet values. There is a moral indignation 
against “unearned income” that is hard for a Westerner to understand. 
The official reformist line labels this attitude with the opprobrious term 
“leveling” and insists that if the money is honestly earned, then it is sheer 
malignant envy to begrudge it. But can one honestly earn money simply 
by buying low and selling high? For many Soviet citizens, it is perfectly 
legitimate if a farmer goes to town and sells his own potatoes. But if the 
farmer hires someone to deliver and sell the potatoes, it is “exploitation” 
of a worker for private profit. And if someone should buy the potatoes 
from the farmer and sell them for a profit in the city, it is “speculation.” 
The roots of these cultural attitudes go deeper than Marxist propaganda. 
                                                          
39. A. Nikonov, “Razvitie kooperatsii i reshenie prodovolstvennoi problemy,” Voprosy 
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The hostility to speculation, for example, goes back to pre-revolutionary 
prejudices against middlemen shared by statesmen and peasants alike; it 
has been reinforced by the recurrent bouts with famine that made profi-
teering seem particularly ghoulish.   
These attitudes are translated into pledges to use taxes to insure social 
justice, as well as into a good deal of official inquisitiveness about the 
percentage of earnings devoted to salaries as opposed to reinvestment. 
High cooperative incomes have also created morale problems for the state 
sector. “How come a steelworker earns less than a person who sells 
shashlik [a tasty kebab-type snack)?”
42
 Economic managers complained 
about a talent drain from the state sector and about unfair tax privileges 
for the cooperatives.
43
  
High incomes are all the more irritating to the population at large be-
cause they seem to be derived from the high prices that are making life 
miserable for everybody else. When the retail consumer market collapsed 
in the latter half of 1988, it seemed that the cooperatives were exploiting 
and perhaps even creating the maddening shortages. There was some 
foundation for this, since cooperatives were often forced to buy their raw 
materials at the same retail outlets as the population. Consumers were 
outraged when a cooperative cafe bought all the coffee in the stores and 
sold it back to the population at inflated prices – especially since the rigid 
command economy ensured that increased demand did not increase the 
supply of coffee.
44
 The dream that the cooperatives would compete with 
the state to the benefit of the consumer was replaced by a more prosaic 
reality: the cooperatives were often used as a semi-legal way to raise state 
prices. Fully 80 percent of the cooperative cafeterias in Leningrad were 
merely substitutes for previously existing state outlets.
45
  
The cooperatives are also associated in the public mind with a new ex-
plosion of organized crime. Before the cooperatives, it is said, the Soviet 
Union had no need of words like mafia, racketeering, and money launder-
ing – even though protection rackets had actually grown up during the 
Brezhnev era when large-scale embezzlement and fraud made many state 
employees vulnerable. The cooperatives are not simply victims of orga-
nized thuggery; they have also become a home for ex-convicts and 
wheeler-dealers from the underground economy of yesteryear.
46
  
                                                          
42. Moscow News, no. 22 (1988), p. 4.   
43. CDSP, 39, no. 16 (1987): 8-9; Moscow News, no. 42 (1988).   
44. Ogonek, no. 7 (1988), p. 4, letter from N. P. Mankov.   
45. CDSP, 41, no. 6 (1989), pp. 4-5.   
46. Literaturnaia gazeta, no. 2 (1989), p. 11.   
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All of the negative images of the cooperatives came together in the 
case of Vadim Tarasov, the “soviet millionaire” who headed the Tekhnika 
cooperative. Tarasov hit the headlines in early 1989 and seemed tailor-
made for opponents of the cooperatives: he had made obscene profits 
simply by selling unused waste material abroad, spending the foreign cur-
rency on computers and selling the computers at home for inflated prices. 
Critics charged that Tarasov was not really selling waste, but rather valu-
able raw material, and that he protected himself by putting high bureau-
crats on the cooperative’s governing board. Tarasov was stoutly defended 
by reformist newspapers such as Moscow News, but even other coopera-
tive businessmen felt that the Tarasov case was a public relations disaster.  
In 1990, Tarasov was outdone by a major political scandal caused by 
the ANT cooperative that was accused of selling Soviet tanks to foreign-
ers. The directors of the cooperative claimed that they were set up, since 
they had purchased tractors and were surprised to receive instead some 
out-of-date tanks. The resulting scandal involved major politicians such 
as Anatoly Sobchak and Nikolai Ryzhkov, who were accused of authoriz-
ing ANT’s alleged machinations. The whole uproar became grist for the 
mill of Ivan Polozkov, the emerging leader of Russia’s conservative 
communists.
47
  
Thus the cooperatives, instead of smoothing the transition to the new 
economic system, have upset many people (especially women) and exac-
erbated tensions.
48
 Conservative forces have not been slow to pick up the 
issue. An ideological platform has been put together: the activities of the 
cooperatives show the dangers of “group selfishness” and of egoistic ac-
tions that hurt the community. The cooperatives are unpatriotic as well, 
even to the extent of exporting tanks. The cooperatives should be seen as 
a manifestation of the “shadow economy: that rose to prominence during 
the era of stagnation. The new millionaires will use the money acquired 
by corrupt activities to buy up the factories after the reformers manage to 
privatize them and in this way dispossess the working class.
49
 The anti-
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cooperative movement also has a solid class basis: the industrial workers, 
who are threatened both by the high prices of the cooperatives and the 
economic success of those who left jobs in the state sector. The most out-
spoken attack on the cooperatives at the Congress of People’s Deputies in 
1989 was from Viktor Shcherbakov, the head of the trade unions. Re-
formers noted grimly that the cooperatives were replacing the bureaucrats 
as the image of the enemy.
50
  
Spokesmen for the cooperatives fought back as best they could. When 
the cooperatives first appeared, it was confidently claimed that competi-
tion would drive prices down. The rigidities of the system and the contin-
ued collapse of the consumer market made this prophecy sound less and 
less plausible. (One exception was flower vending, where the coopera-
tives have had the hoped-for positive impact.)
51
 The cooperatives then 
pointed out the many difficulties that added to their production costs: 
problems in obtaining registration and in leasing space, discriminatory 
prices for raw materials, vulnerability to corrupt pressures. The state sec-
tor has managed to use its power to prevent any real competition between 
cooperatives and state enterprises; state economic managers made it clear 
that they wanted the cooperatives to do no more than “tighten up the 
nuts” for state industry. No steps have been taken to establish the prom-
ised wholesale market for raw materials, so that the cooperatives have 
been forced into competing with individual consumers for supplies. In 
this and other ways, the cooperatives feel that they have been set up as a 
scapegoat for the overall failure of the economy.
52
  
Cooperative spokesmen admit that many of the new entrepreneurs 
have criminal records, but they ask in response: isn’t it understandable 
that during the Brezhnev era of stagnation, many enterprising people end-
ed up on the wrong side of the law? One association of cooperatives has 
even set up a program for helping young ex-convicts go straight.
53
  
The top leadership no longer seemed anxious to associate the reform 
program too closely with the disreputable urban cooperatives, and so their 
fate became tied up with the progress of reform at local levels. Unrecon-
structed local authorities seemed to measure their performance by the 
number of cooperatives they closed; newly elected reform officials (such 
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as the Moscow city council in 1990) promptly reversed many anti-
cooperative restrictions. Under these circumstances, the cooperatives 
were forced to band together and organize in order to make their case to 
the public as well as to provide services needed by the fledgling coopera-
tives. In this way the cooperative movement is making an impact on the 
political system that matches its impact on the economic system, for we 
are witnessing the birth of openly conducted interest-group politics.   
Thus the cooperatives are a source of creativity not only in the eco-
nomic sphere but the political sphere. But they are also vulnerable to 
pressure in both spheres. Cooperatives in other socialist countries have 
not succeeded in breaking out of a vicious circle of vulnerability. The less 
respectable the cooperatives are, the less anyone reputable wants to be-
come a cooperative businessman, and the more difficult it is to shake the 
nepman image.
54
 Shortages pose another dilemma: if cooperatives are 
given economic independence in an environment of general shortage, 
they will be seen as speculators – but if their activities are restricted, they 
will be forced to the shady side of the law in order to obtain supplies. In 
either case, they will be pushed to a marginal economic and political posi-
tion. The private sector managed to break out of this marginal position in 
Poland, but at the cost of an unholy alliance with a corrupt economic bu-
reaucracy.
55
  
All of these sources of vulnerability had their counterpart in the NEP-
that-was and helped prepare its premature demise. The reformers are still 
hoping to activate the NEP-that-might-have-been: the cooperatives will 
help the whole economy by providing not only salutary competition, but 
also the work ethic of an industrious khoziain. But one lesson of the NEP-
that-was is that independent cooperatives cannot survive in an atmosphere 
of economic crisis and political hostility, and so the future of the coopera-
tives depends on the overall health of the new NEP.   
What connects all the aspects of the NEP alternative – khozraschet in 
industry, revival of the peasantry in the countryside, and urban coopera-
tives in daily life – is the wager on the new socialist khoziain. Gorbachev 
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has proposed a man named Anatoly Volochensky as a model khoziain. 
When Volochensky informed Gorbachev of his reasons for going over to 
agricultural rental contracts, he “emphasized the possibility of free and 
independent decision-making and of working and acting depending on the 
conditions, without having anyone order him about or interfere in his 
work. . . . There was no talk of profit or income, but just of a man finally 
seeing his potential as a farmer realized.”
56
 
  
“Which Road Leads to the Temple?”: NEP and the Road to Social-
ism 
The profound crisis of Soviet society has given rise to some very trou-
bling questions. If the system requires radical restructuring, perhaps the 
original construction plan was a bad one. Perhaps the October Revolution 
and the triumph of the Bolsheviks was a tragedy for Russia. These devas-
tating doubts are directly expressed in Forward! Forward! Forward!, a 
play published in 1988 by the path-breaking historical dramatist Mikhail 
Shatrov.
57
 The cast of characters is made up of a striking range of Russian 
political activists who had some connection to the Bolshevik revolution 
of October 1917: non-Bolshevik revolutionaries, liberals, White Guard 
officers, as well as Bolshevik supporters and opponents of Stalin. Many 
of these characters have never appeared in Soviet political theater, or only 
in the stereotyped form described by one critic: “The Menshevik Martov, 
who slobbers and drops his pince-nez; the SR Spiridonova, who is flat-
chested, hysterical, and carries a gun in her fur-muff; the lordly Plekhan-
ov, terribly distant from the people; Trotsky, who is either selling out 
Mother Russia in mysterious ambassadorial residences or who flops him-
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self down on the sofa with a French novel [at the height of the civil 
war].”
58
  
Shatrov’s play jumps forward and backward in time, and allows the 
characters to comment freely on events and to confront Lenin with the 
consequences of his decision to take power in 1917. The question is stark-
ly presented: was the October revolution a mistake? Given the horrors of 
Stalinism, were Lenin’s critics right to oppose him in 1917? Shatrov’s an-
swer is that Stalinism was a distortion and a betrayal of the revolution and 
that the genuine Bolshevik heritage was represented by NEP. But this re-
sponse gives rise to a further question: if NEP represents an alternative to 
Stalinism, why was it rejected at the end of the 1920s? Was this rejection 
inevitable? Was it justifiable?  
A Soviet writer has observed that “perestroika has made all of us his-
torians.” It is not simply an interest in the past that has led to self- scruti-
ny so intense that in 1988 all school examinations in history were can-
celled. There is a widespread feeling that Soviet society has been travel-
ling on a road leading to a dead end: in order to find its way, the society 
must go back to where the wrong turning was made. The fundamental 
question is “which path leads to the temple?” – the temple dedicated to 
the best ideals of the Soviet past.
59
  
The historical fate of NEP is central to this search for the correct path. 
Despite the wide variety of competing answers in the Soviet newspapers 
and journals, three general approaches can be distinguished.   
1. The abolition of NEP was not inevitable, but justifiable. In his pio-
neering critique of Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev did not shed any tears over 
the abandonment of NEP. “Violations of socialist legality” occurred only 
some years after the great breakthrough: 
  
Let us consider for a moment what would have happened if in 
1928-29 the political line of the right deviation had prevailed among 
us. . . . We would not now have a powerful heavy industry, we would 
not have the kolkhozes, we would find ourselves disarmed and weak 
in a capitalist encirclement. . . . It was precisely during the period of 
1935-1937-1938 that the practice of mass repression through the state 
apparatus was born.
60
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This Khrushchev-era critique is represented by Anatoly Rybakov’s 
Children of the Arbat, a novel begun under Khrushchev but published on-
ly under Gorbachev. The heroes of the novel – the fictional Sasha Pankra-
tov and the historical Sergei Kirov – are supporters of the “revolution 
from above” that destroyed NEP, and one of the principal negative char-
acters (a pool shark named Kostya) is portrayed as an anachronistic nep-
man. The main drama of the novel comes from Stalin’s degeneration and 
his descent into active criminality in 1934.
61
  
In 1987, despite his favorable view of NEP, Gorbachev remained with-
in the limits of Khrushchev’s critique. In his speech on the seventieth an-
niversary of the revolution, Gorbachev stated that the abandonment of 
NEP led to bureaucratization and over-centralization, the end of glasnost’ 
and democracy, and the peasant’s loss of the status of a true khoziain. But 
Gorbachev still criticized Bukharin and other defenders of NEP for over-
looking the life-and-death importance of time. The threat of imperialist 
aggression and the imperative of extremely rapid industrialization meant 
that collectivization was necessary despite the mistakes in its implementa-
tion.   
Gorbachev has slowly but steadily moved away from even this condi-
tional defense of the destruction of NEP. In a 1989 speech going over the 
same events, Gorbachev’s condemnation was more stark: the destruction 
of NEP was “a serious strategic miscalculation and a deviation from 
Marxist views”: it led to the famine of 1932-33, the crimes of dekulakiza-
tion, and the “administrative-command system” of managing society as a 
whole. The denunciation of collectivization was balanced only by a mere 
nod in the direction of orthodoxy. Despite Gorbachev’s studied vagueness 
on the objective and subjective causes of NEP’s demise, he left no doubt 
that he no longer thought it was justifiable. On this issue, Gorbachev fi-
nally caught up with his supporters. 
Gorbachev’s interpretation of Lenin’s testament also changed in ac-
cordance with his view of the priorities of the reform process. In 1990, 
when ethnic violence and economic crisis had led to increasing talk of 
civil war, Gorbachev saw Lenin’s central message as the insistence on 
peaceful reform rather than violent confrontation.
62
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2. The abolition of NEP was neither inevitable nor justifiable. The in-
telligentsia supporters of perestroika agree that the abolition of NEP was 
not inevitable and that real alternatives existed. But in their view the 
wrong alternative was chosen: the party took the wrong path, with tragic 
consequences for socialism and for Soviet society.   
The basic postulate of this consensus is that the rejection of NEP was a 
rejection of Lenin’s political testament. In 1987, Fedor Burlatsky pub-
lished a one-act play entitled Political Testament. Burlatsky’s play is set 
in the late 1920s and shows a peasant father and his two sons, one of 
whom is a Bukharinist and the other a Stalinist. The Bukharinist son tells 
his father that the issue between the brothers is “what will happen to 
NEP? Will it be prolonged, or rolled back? . . . At the end of 1922, the 
sick Lenin dictated five articles. [It is this testament] that we’re arguing 
about.
63
 It is clear the Burlatsky thinks that the Bukharinist son has much 
the stronger case. But as Burlatsky’s parable of two brothers implies, the 
argument over Lenin’s testament was a schism within Bolshevism. The 
reformers have to provide an explanation for this fatal misstep without 
seeming to condemn Bolshevism as a whole.   
One way to solve this problem is to blame the leaders, rather than the 
party. Lenin’s “Letter to the Congress” can be used for this purpose. (This 
letter by itself is sometimes also called Lenin’s testament.) The letter was 
actually a series of notes dictated by Lenin in preparation for the party 
congress scheduled for spring 1923. In these notes, Lenin made damaging 
remarks about all the top Bolshevik leaders; in a postscript he proposed 
that Stalin be relieved of the post of general secretary. We now know that 
the contents of the letter quickly became known to the rest of the Politbu-
ro, but only after Lenin’s death in 1924 were his suggestions made known 
to the wider party public.
64
 Stalin duly offered his resignation, but he was 
urged to remain on the job by his fellow leaders, if only because they 
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needed his services in the fight against Trotsky. The existence of the letter 
was not secret during Stalin’s time in power. The interested student could 
read in Stalin’s collected works the following passage from a 1927 
speech: “They say that in this ‘testament,’ comrade Lenin suggested to 
the Congress that in light of Stalin’s ‘crudeness,’ it should consider the 
question of replacing Stalin as general secretary. This is completely cor-
rect.”
65
 The full text of the letter was finally published after Stalin’s 
death.   
It is only natural that once perestroika was under way, Lenin’s letter 
would be endlessly discussed in the press, with an underlying message of 
“if only we had listened to Lenin.” Many felt that the failure of the Bol-
shevik leaders – particularly Zinoviev and Kamenev – to carry out Len-
in’s wishes and insist on Stalin’s removal was (in the words of Dmitri 
Kazutin of the Moscow News) “precisely apostasy.”
66
 This explanation 
relies on the Lenin cult to drive out the Stalin cult. One critic wrote that 
the argument seems to be that “Lenin is right, because he is Lenin; the 
will of Ily’ich [a familiar name for Lenin] is law that must be carried out; 
anyone who doesn’t carry it out is an intriguer and a political hack.”
67
  
Another convenient scapegoat is Lev Trotsky, even though he was re-
moved from all positions of influence long before the rejection of NEP. 
Trotsky is accused of starting a power struggle within the party because 
of his overweening ambition. This accusation draws strength from an an-
ti-political attitude still current today that “the struggle for power is al-
ways unprincipled, since it is for oneself and not for principles and the 
truth.”
68
 Gorbachev lent his support to another popular theory that Trot-
sky was the originator of Stalin’s policies of “super-industrialization” and 
exploitation of the peasantry. According to this theory, all Stalin did was 
“out-Trotsky Trotsky.” This theory was seductive because it requires the 
smallest possible break with the previous orthodoxy that cast the Left 
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Opposition as a villainous faction. The condemnation of Trotsky also 
unites reformers with less liberal currents who see Trotsky as the “anti-
national” evil genius of the revolution.
69
  
To blame the top Bolshevik leaders for not getting rid of Stalin implies 
that the major reason for the degeneration of the revolution was Stalin’s 
abuse of power. Social philosopher Anatoly Butenko has put this conclu-
sion in the form of a thesis on Stalin’s “usurpation of power”: “relying on 
the cadres selected by him and creating an administrative-bureaucratic 
pyramid, [Stalin] secured unquestioned one-man rule.” Thus the dictator-
ship of the proletariat ceased to exist, and the party as Lenin understood it 
was almost destroyed.
70
 Butenko’s usurpation formula expresses extreme 
moral revulsion from Stalinism as anti-socialist, while at the same time 
removing most of the blame from the Bolshevik party and the Soviet 
people. Despite its focus on Stalin as an individual, however, the usurpa-
tion explanation cannot avoid a wider question: why did the party allow it 
to take place?  
This question has set the framework for the serious historical investi-
gations of NEP that began to appear in 1988. Historians have argued over 
the reality of the economic crisis of the late 1920s that gave Stalin his ex-
cuse for destroying NEP. One influential interpretation argued that mis-
takes in policy had made a crisis in town-country relations all but inevita-
ble by 1925. Stalin’s solution to the crisis was to apply “emergency 
measures” on a permanent basis against kulak sabotage, as well as wreck-
ers and class enemies of all descriptions. This solution found support be-
cause of a long-standing tendency toward “petty-bourgeois revolution-
ism” in the party.
71
 
If the historians are correct that the Bukharinist alternative was genu-
inely rejected by the majority of the party, then explanations must go 
deeper than the mistakes of the leadership. In coming to grips with the 
party’s tragic misstep, reformers most often look to the earlier period of 
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“War Communism.” War Communism is the name usually given to the 
economic policies of the period 1918-1921; its hallmark was the extreme 
concentration of all available resources in order to win the civil war and 
prevent complete economic collapse, with a consequent inability to use 
material incentives. The official line has always been that War Com-
munism was an enforced set of emergency measures that were abandoned 
when the emergency was over.   
Most reformers, however, would agree with Roy Medvedev when he 
described Stalinism as “a more horrific version of War Communism.” 
Medvedev argues that the Bolshevik leaders who introduced War Com-
munism saw it as a regrettable but temporary necessity.
72
 If this is so, 
then War Communism’s destructive effect on many Bolsheviks was a 
tragic circumstance that casts no shadow on the heart of the Bolshevik en-
terprise. In the words of one of Shatrov’s characters (the non-Bolshevik 
revolutionary Maria Spiridonova): “October was a pure stream; it was the 
civil war that muddied.”
73
 Matters are more serious if War Communism 
represented an alternative conception of socialism. The economist Vasily 
Seliunin has argued that Lenin resorted to terror during the civil war 
mainly because he was still in thrall to the utopianism of traditional so-
cialism and did not understand that material incentives were needed to 
motivate producers. Seliunin is an insightful economic critic but not a 
very adequate historian; his article betrays very little feel for the civil war, 
a period in which material incentives were in extremely short supply.
74
  
If Seliunin criticized the Lenin of War Communism, it was all for the 
greater glory of the Lenin of NEP. But the emphasis on NEP and the last 
articles has allowed many Soviet intellectuals to reject most of what Len-
in stood for, while claiming that they are not rejecting Lenin himself, 
since “the evolution of Lenin’s views graphically attests to his greatness 
and his political genius.”
75
  
It sometimes seems as if the concept of War Communism has expand-
ed far beyond the civil-war policies of 1918-21 to include all the revolu-
tionary fervor and the ideological commitment that today’s reformers find 
so distasteful in the Soviet Union’s founding fathers.
76
 The conflict be-
tween War Communism and NEP then becomes a split within Bolshe-
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vism itself, one that continues in different forms right up to today: Left 
and Right in the 1920s, Stalinist and Bukharinist in the 1930s, “dogma-
tists” and reformers in the 1960s, opponents and supporters of perestroika 
today.
77
 The image of the two Bolshevisms struggling for the soul of the 
party is probably dominant today among those intellectuals who have not 
given up on Bolshevism altogether.   
3. The abolition of NEP was inevitable. The reformist writers who see 
NEP as a viable alternative are all concerned to save the honor of the Bol-
shevik revolution, or at least the NEP wing of Bolshevism. There are 
many Soviet writers who do not feel any such loyalty to Bolshevism and 
who deny that NEP was a genuine alternative to Stalinism. Nationalists 
who detest intelligentsia reformers as much as they do Stalinism and 
Brezhnevism charge that intellectuals only turned away from Stalin in 
1937 when the repression finally cut a wide swath in the educated clas-
ses.
78
 As a consequence, the intelligentsia critique is not radical enough 
and ignores the larger social forces behind Stalin. If asked to give a con-
crete description of these large social forces, some writers in this camp 
will refer to shadowy world-wide conspiracies with a Judeo-Masonic 
tinge.
79
 The poverty of their own explanations, however, does not exclude 
the possibility of insightful criticisms of the reformist version of events.   
The principal spokesman for this trend, Vadim Kozhinov, has used 
Rybakov’s novel Children of the Arbat as an example of how the intelli-
gentsia critique trivializes the emergence of Stalinism by reducing it to an 
intrigue by a demented egomaniac and his unscrupulous hirelings. This 
type of explanation views the intellectuals only as victims and in particu-
lar does not question the pre-Stalin Bolshevik consensus of NEP. In a 
widely discussed series of articles, Aleksandr Tsipko argued that NEP did 
not bring about any change in the most damaging Bolshevik tenets: the 
demand for a total break with the past, the condescending attitude toward 
the peasant, the refusal to accept the constraints of the rule of law, and the 
denial of religious values.
80
 Tsipko makes an exception for Bukharin, but 
Kozhinov and others feel that the current deification of Bukharin is a 
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good example of the limitations of the intelligentsia critique. Iurii Emeli-
anov devoted an entire book to cutting Bukharin down to size. Assem-
bling all the compromising material glossed over by admirers of Bukha-
rin, Emelianov used Bukharin in order to condemn the Bolshevik leader-
ship as a whole (with the exception of Lenin). The book combines a 
genuinely insightful discussion of the effects of civil war with the popular 
but dubious argument that Bukharin was in the grip of “Russophobia.”
81
 
At first this critique spared Lenin himself, but only at the cost of disas-
sociating him completely from the rest of Bolshevism. The last articles 
are used as evidence that Lenin finally realized that progress was only 
possible through “development of the best models of tradition and the re-
sults of existing peasant culture.”
82
 But, alas, he was unheeded by the rest 
of the Bolshevik leadership; in fact, argues Kozhinov, Lenin was factual-
ly removed from power before his final collapse in 1923, since the rest of 
the leadership flouted all his wishes with impunity. Lenin’s privileged 
status did not last, and nationalist critiques were soon more open in their 
total rejection of Bolshevism. As a result, the nationalist intellectuals did 
not see NEP as a real alternative to Stalinism – indeed (in the words of 
Apollon Kuzmin) “1929 was in no way a departure from the policies of 
the l920s, but their natural development.”
83
  
The nationalist anti-intelligentsia critique is not the only analysis to 
maintain that NEP was not a viable alternative to Stalinism. Igor Kliam-
kin, a writer who fully shares the values of the reformist intellectuals, has 
maintained that “NEP, called forth to replace war communism, created 
the conditions for its revival and secure establishment.”
84
 Kliamkin goes 
beyond the villainy of individual Bolshevik leaders and the illusions of 
socialist intellectuals to examine the sociological bases of Stalinism. One 
base was the newly-recruited industrial class, living in terrible conditions, 
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uprooted from one culture and not yet rooted in another, intolerant of a 
minority’s right to disrupt social unity. Stalinism’s sacrifice of the present 
for the sake of the future, its heady mixture of enthusiasm and repression, 
was more understandable to these workers than NEP’s celebration of the 
market and private accumulation. NEP’s roots in the countryside were al-
so vulnerable. Neither a European market system nor a European political 
system could take root in a country with scattered pre-capitalist villages 
dominated by communal traditions. The imperatives of national inde-
pendence in a peasant country destroyed NEP and made the institution of 
some kind of autocratic rule inevitable.   
Kliamkin agrees with the liberal reformers that the only solution for 
the Soviet Union is the market system and the virtues of the Protestant 
work ethic, but he criticizes them for their moralistic search for villains, 
coupled with a lack of understanding of the complex cultural precondi-
tions of a successful market system. In the past, Russian intellectuals al-
lowed their love of genuinely admirable European ideals to blind them to 
the reality of their own society. This is why the liberals failed, the non-
Bolshevik socialists failed, and finally why the Bolshevik Old Guard 
failed. To some, Kliamkin’s analysis seems like blaming the victim. But 
can the Russian people really be blamed because history did not make 
them able to carry out European ideals? “Can we repent of the fact that 
we are what we are?”  
Why was NEP the road not taken? This is the question that every re-
former must address. The aim of the investigation into the defeat of NEP 
is not only to find out who is to blame, but even more importantly, to find 
out what is to be done. Even writers like Kozhinov and Kliamkin who re-
ject the idea of an alternative in the past feel that the Soviet Union today 
is in an era of great choices. Under these circumstances, the failure of 
NEP may be the best available guide to the success of perestroika.   
 
The Waning of NEP  
By 1990 the NEP image had run out of steam. To be sure, NEP was 
still invoked by prominent reformers and scholarly interest in the NEP pe-
riod remained high.
85
 But the scope of the reform process had clearly 
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moved beyond the point where NEP would play a central role either as a 
guide or as a legitimizing symbol.   
At the beginning of perestroika, the challenge was to show that the 
market was compatible with socialism. By 1990, the challenge was to 
show that socialism was compatible with the market. The deepening eco-
nomic crisis, the full-speed-ahead market reforms in Eastern Europe, and 
the Communist Party’s growing inability to police the boundaries of po-
litical discourse – all of these factors contributed to making “khozraschet 
socialism” less full-bodied than the demand for a “normal” Western-style 
market economy, with all that this implied in terms of high productivity, 
the rule of law, and openness to the world. Cooperatives were now 
viewed as a stepping stone to private property: 
According to Andrei Orlov, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers’ 
State Commission on Economic Reform “. . . private property’s need to 
hide out under an assumed name (i.e., cooperative, family, or collective 
property) is nothing but a concession to people still not ready to accept 
it.” Orlov said that this should dispel Western businessmen’s skepticism 
and fear.
86
  
NEP meant the toleration of the market on the road to socialism; if the 
reformers of perestroika were indeed on the same road, they were travel-
ling in the opposite direction. 
  Another reason for the waning of NEP was the new political scope of 
the reform movement. The shift from party to state began in 1988 when 
Gorbachev announced plans at the 19
th
 party conference for the creation 
of a new national legislature. In 1989 the national legislature became the 
focus of political attention; in 1990 the Communist Party renounced its de 
jure right to a political monopoly and at the same time revealed its de fac-
to abdication of a leadership role in the reform process. These develop-
ments forced reformers to take another look at the 1920s as the period 
when opposition within and without the party was definitively outlawed. 
Articles in the reformist press began to stress other sides of Lenin’s herit-
age, such as endorsement of monolithic party unity or his deportation of 
prominent representatives of the intelligentsia in 1922. An article in Ar-
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gumenty i fakty stated bluntly that “the foundations of the future Stalinist 
model of society were laid between 1922 and 1924.”
87
  
The shift in perspective can be seen by comparing two remarks by Len 
Karpinsky, a “half-dissident” who had rejoined the party after 1985. In an 
interview conducted sometime before April 1989, when he was still ready 
to defend the party, Karpinsky used the 1920s as an image of pluralism: 
“we had [then] the kind of diverse structures and pluralism toward which 
we are now striving.” But by 1990 he was sufficiently disillusioned with 
the party to draw a different lesson: “In the 1920s the party kept at bay a 
multiparty system, freedom of speech and the press.”
88
 The reformers’ 
new skepticism about the political implications of NEP had already been 
expressed by Fazil Iskander in 1988: 
  
The awful thing is that, remembering the Party arguments of the 
time, I somehow cannot remember one man who put forward a pro-
gram for the democratization of the country. There were arguments 
about inter-party democracy but I don’t remember any others. And 
we must recognize in this the spiritual guilt of all the revolutionary 
leaders of the time. What was this? Disdain for so-called bourgeois 
democracy . . . or fear of new competitors? I think it was both. In 
such conditions Stalin, naturally, proved to be the best Stalinist, and 
won.
89
 
  
The waning of NEP coincided with a generational shift in the leader-
ship of the reform movement. The original intelligentsia spokesmen for 
perestroika came from the generation variously called “the children of the 
Twentieth Congress” (when Khrushchev denounced Stalin in 1956) or 
“the people of the sixties.” These were people who had committed them-
selves to the reforms of the Khrushchev era and saw perestroika as a con-
tinuation with better leadership and a better strategy. As the reform 
movement progressed and as new economic and political opportunities 
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opened up, it was inevitable that a new generation would come forward – 
a generation that had matured during the Brezhnev “stagnation era” and 
shared some of the characteristics of that era. Among these were an ahis-
torical dismissal of the past and a more and more open fascination with 
the Western world.
90
  
It was hardly likely that members of this new generation would follow 
the example of Egor Yakovlev, the editor of the Moscow News, and actu-
ally study Lenin for inspiration. If they read Lenin, it was more probably 
because they were searching for incriminating quotations.
91
 Insofar as his 
generation needed an intelligentsia spokesman, it would be someone like 
Aleksandr Tsipko, who simply dismissed the Bolsheviks along with the 
whole revolutionary intelligentsia as arrogant fanatics.
92
 The relation be-
tween the two generations can be compared to the relation between the 
Old Bolsheviks who started the revolution and the vast mass of party 
members who signed up during the civil war. The older generation shared 
many assumptions with their opponents; their fiery polemics were partly 
aimed at convincing themselves. The younger generation that was re-
cruited after the fighting had started was so distant from the heritage of 
the past that they were impatient with polemics when action was needed. 
Don’t refute the apparatchiki – just get rid of them!  
The great burst of historical interest had not died out completely, but it 
had moved back from the 1920s to the civil war and the revolution itself. 
Articles in the popular press became less interested in Bolshevik martyrs 
such as Bukharin and more interested in examining the historical alterna-
tives to Bolshevism itself. Sympathetic articles appeared on the Menshe-
viks, the liberal Constitutional Democrats, the peasant-based Socialist 
Revolutionaries and the radical Left Socialist Revolutionaries that briefly 
shared power with the Bolsheviks.
93
 More and more, the fatal misturning 
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of Russian history was placed in 1917 rather than 1929. The official de-
fense of the revolution was just that – a defense, rather than a celebration. 
This defense focused more on the tragic necessities of a time of troubles 
rather than on any spirited identification with Bolshevik values.
94
  
The NEP alternative will be seen by historians as an important but ul-
timately transitory phase of the reform movement. This should not detract 
from its value, not only as a bridge from communism to a market econo-
my, but as a set of political ideals with its own integrity. These ideals are 
expounded by the Bukharin character in Shatrov’s play Forward! For-
ward! Forward!:  
 
[We stand] for a slow, decades-long process of growing into so-
cialism through the systematic growth of industry, through coopera-
tives) through a thousand and one intermediary forms of cooperation, 
from the lowest to the highest. We stand for replacing the slogan 
“who beats whom” with “who is allied with whom?” – for overcom-
ing difficulties principally with economic methods. We believe the 
economy should serve man, and not man the economy. We are for 
soviet law, and not soviet arbitrariness; [we want] a free and varied 
culture. We are for the political dictatorship of the party, but a party 
that does not forget [Lenin’s words on the dangers of a party of obe-
dient fools]. We want a sharp repulse to nationalism, both the crude 
anti-semitic kind as well as the most subtle – Ilyich demanded this as 
well. We stand for conscience – it does not (as some think) lose its 
validity in politics. We want it to be always remembered that just as 
dry water cannot exist, neither can inhumane socialism.
95
 
  
The reformers’ use of NEP shows how a real past can give rise to an 
ideal past which turns into an ideal future. Although the NEP ideal may 
not be the path that leads to the temple, it will be remembered for its ser-
vice as the inspiration for the pioneers of perestroika.   
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